48 Hours to Tibet?

Map showing time to nearest city, in hours and days

According to this map published by the European Commission in 2010, much of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China is as “inaccessible” as Greenland, and is less accessible than most of Siberia. Time required to travel to the nearest city over 50,000 inhabitants, is, for much of Tibet, between two and ten days.

Tibet’s geographic isolation from much of the rest of China—due to its rugged topography and high altitude on the Tibetan Plateau—has contributed to its cultural and ethnic differences from the rest of China. Though Tibet has been part of China since 1951, the Tibetan Autonomous Region is still over 90% Tibetan, while the Han population, dominant in eastern China, stands at around 6%. Tibet’s average population density is roughly two people per square kilometer—making it the country’s least dense region.

Despite Tibet’s geographic isolation, the region has been a source of tension for China’s Communist Party, as Tibetans have historically resisted Chinese rule. Struggles between Chinese and Tibetans have persisted, generating ethnic riots in 2008. Since then, however, the Chinese government has decided to focus on business and infrastructure to try to integrate Tibet with the rest of China; in 2009 alone, the Chinese government invested $3 million dollars in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

These infrastructural investments may change both Tibet’s accessibility and its ethnic unity. On September 26, 2010, the Chinese government began construction on a railroad extension that will connect Shigatse, Tibet’s second largest city, to Lhasa and hence to the rest of China. A trip from Shigatse to Shanghai will take roughly forty-eight hours, though construction on the extension is expected to take four years and cost the equivalent of two billion U.S. dollars.

Chinese Railway Map, green highlighting planned extension

Shigatse, the administrative center of Xigâze Prefecture, is only about 450 kilometers (280 miles) from the Nepalese border. Extending the railroad from Lhasa, Tibet’s capital, southwest to Shigatse will not only allow for better connections between eastern China and south-central Tibet, but it will also facilitate a further extension to the border of Nepal, perhaps eventually to Kathmandu.

Though the Chinese government lauds the railroad project in Tibet for its potential to promote cultural unity, many Tibetans feel differently. Shigatse is the location of the Tashilhunpo Monastery of the Panchen Lama, Tibetan Buddhism’s second highest monk. As such, the city has become an important symbol of the power struggle between the heads of Tibetan Buddhism and the Communist Party of China; in 1995, the Chinese government took the then six year old Panchen Lama into “protective custody,” and Tibetans have heard little news of the Panchen Lama since then. Many Tibetans took this as a Chinese effort to gain control over the Dalai Lama and undermine Tibetan autonomy, and thus are hesitant to see further Han influence in the region. Increasing the accessibility of Shigatse via the national railway will allow the immigration of large number of Han Chinese, potentially weakening the cultural integrity of the city.

In addition to the railway extension, a new airport will soon be completed in Shigatse. The Peace Airport, as it will be named (a name that mirrors “Friendship Highway”—the portion of the Chinese highway that runs between the Tibetan cities of Lhasa to Zhangmu), will be Tibet’s fifth civil air transportation facility. Although the airport was set to be complete by October 2010, construction has apparently been delayed and the latest reports expect that it will open in November at the earliest.

The concern for Tibetans is not the gaining of access to the rest of China, but rather the potential for large-scale Han migration further into Tibet. Though many Tibetans resent the influx of Han Chinese, transportation development has generated strong economic growth. In 2009, the Tibetan economy grew by 12 percent, an even higher figure than that of China as a whole. Still, it remains unclear how much of this economic growth benefits native Tibetans, rather than Han investors and immigrants.

The railway extension will also affect mining. Tibet is thought to have China’s largest deposits of copper and chromium, minerals that are in high demand in eastern China’s burgeoning industrial cities. A strong railroad network will make transportation of workers and minerals more financially and logistically feasible.

The planned extension of the Tibetan railway is highly controversial. Will it dramatically dilute the Tibetan population, stimulate friendship between China and its Tibetan Autonomous Region, or intensify Tibetan sentiments for independence? Only time will tell.

Serbian LGBT Rights in a Pan-European Perspective

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As the EU expands membership in Southeastern Europe, economic stability is not the only barrier to entry. Human rights standards, specifically policies affectingLesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons (LGBT) rights in the applicant country, are also considered in the membership process. The Intergroup on LGBT rights withinthe EU Parliament that monitors the European LGBT climate recently voiced support for the holding of a Serbian gay pride parade despite threats of violent protest. Before October, 2010, Serbia had not held a gay pride parade since 2001, citing security concerns as grounds for postponing such processions indefinitely. This year’s parade went ahead as planned, yet not without incident—homemade bombs and aggressive signage were among more vocal protesting methods. However, with Europe watching intently, the crucialpoint is that the parade actually occurred.

Serbia first applied for EU membership in December of 2009, making it the fourth former Yugoslav republic to submit an application (Slovenia joined in 2004; Croatia applied in 2003, and Macedonia in 2004). Prominent politicians have echoed support for Serbia’s accession, including EU Justice Commissioner Jaques Barrot. As Barrot argued, “we want Europe to really be Europe, and that will not be possible without Serbia.” Barrot echoes a longstanding sentiment that Serbia belongs to Europe, both geographically and culturally.

Amid such support for accession, Serbia continues to be criticized for its harbo

ring of former war criminals, several of whom remain in hiding years after the most recent Balkan conflicts. Some EU member states have suggested that the Serbian government is not using its full resources to bring the criminals to court; they want to see more progress here before membership deliberations can continue. Kosovo is another contentious topic, as most EU governments recognize Kosovo as an independent state, but Serbia steadfastly refuses to acknowledge its legitimacy. But as each EU member state individually decides on issues of diplomatic recognition, Kosovo is not necessarily a deal breaker for Serbian membership.

The LGBT issue presents a microcosm of the human rights dynamic in contemporary Serbia. Yet Serbia is not the lone conservative voice on gay and lesbian rights in Europe among EU members, Estonia, Italy, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia do not recognize gay marriage or civil partnerships. Bulgaria, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, moreover, limit their constitutional definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, as does Serbia.

Countries seeking EU membership sometimes push for a more liberal position on the LGBT community. When Croatia applied for membership in 2003, it legalized unregistered homosexual cohabitation, and in 2009, it added new anti-discrimination legislation for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender persons. Similarly, Serbia bolstered anti-discrimination legislation in 2009, also the year they applied for EU membership. In contrast, Macedonia, which is not actively seeking inclusion in the EU, has done little to improve LGBT rights.

Now that Serbia has successfully allowed a gay pride parade, eyes turn to Bosnia and Herzegovina as it prepares an EU application. Current Bornian legislation does not limit marriage to be between a man and a woman, yet only partial protection exists for the LGBT community. As the former Yugoslav republics renew and strengthen diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe, legislation on LGBT issues might be swift, yet the actual liberalization process could be sluggish. Strong nationalistic environments often further homophobic sentiments; Serbia with its deeply ingrained nationalism will have to work hard to be the exception, not the rule.

Is Taiwan’s defense of indigenous language just words?

The Republic of China, Formosa, or Taiwan: whichever name is used, the island is frequently noted in the news as a source of diplomatic tension, due largely to its ambiguous political status. Less commonly discussed is internal Taiwanese politics, including the rocky relationship between the dominant Han Chinese and minority indigenous groups. But both the Taiwanese government and international groups have recently begun to look more closely at this issue. Steps are now being taken to address the political marginalization and cultural degradation of the so-called Taiwanese Aborigines.

These changes may be just in time. Most scholars agree that Taiwan is the ancestral homeland of the Austronesian peoples and therefore the source of the Austronesian language family, one of the world’s most widespread linguistic groups. In Taiwan, however, over half of the original 27 Austronesian languages have already been lost and several of the remainder are threatened with extinction. Only 35% of Taiwan’s 500,000 indigenous people (~2% of the population) can speak their tribal language, a figure that is expected to decline as younger generations are increasingly drawn to Chinese and English.

Cultural degradation has resulted from centuries of foreign rule and oppressive policies. Although each of the controlling group’s impact has varied, all have repressed indigenous rights and contributed to the linguistic decay.

Dutch East India Company Period (1624-1661): Indigenous language and culture was fairly stable during this period. As a business rather than a government, the Dutch East India Company was preoccupied with the profitability of its ports and therefore did not concern itself with indigenous peoples in the rest of the island. However, the Company’s need for labor to work its sugar plantations began the process of prolific Chinese immigration.

Koxinga Period (1661-1683): Koxinga, a military leader and Ming loyalist, forced the Dutch off of the island and established it as a base from which to launch his attack on the mainland Qing Dynasty. Koxinga and later his son, Cheng Ching, were preoccupied with military events and therefore did not interfere significantly into the lives of indigenous peoples. However, as agriculture and development expanded in this short period, Chinese civilization also spread and began to become a contentious issue in occupied lands.

Qing Dynasty/ Manchu Period (1683-1895): Han Chinese farmers and other long-term settlers continued to immigrate in large numbers to Taiwan, displacing or assimilating the indigenous groups of the western lowlands. Assimilation often came through intermarriage, as Han men were not permitted to bring their wives to the island until the late 1700s. The situation in the highlands was different, as the rugged terrain helped indigenous groups resist Han migrants. The government’s two main strategies for dealing with the highland tribes were development by pacification and defensive segregation. Under the former, indigenous group leaders (tou-mu) were targeted and subordinated and their people were subject to imposition of Chinese customs. In the latter, physical separation was maintained by the by the Ai-Yun Line, a constructed wall with guard posts that administratively, legally and geographically divided the island’s plains and mountains. The impact of this policy is reflected in the distribution of indigenous groups today, as seen in the maps below.

Japanese Colonial Period (1895-1945): During this period, the vast majority of mountain peoples were forcibly relocated to the lowlands and the Ai-Yun line was fortified to confine the remaining indigenous groups to the interior. Rebellions were met with force. The Japanese authority implemented a strict social policy that relegated aboriginals to the bottom of the social hierarchy, subjecting them to forced labor. Indigenous groups were also forced to learn Japanese and adopt new names.

Chinese Nationalist/ KMT Period (1949-1996): Acute cultural degradation continued under the Chinese Nationalist regime. Once again, indigenous groups were forced to learn a new language. Under the 1951 “life-improving proclamation,” Mandarin was promoted and indigenous traditions were prohibited. Policies, however, were generally less harsh than they had been under the Japanese government. As Taiwan gradually democratized in the late 1980s and 1990s, conditions grew favorable for indigenous rights. Grassroots political organization and student-led movements helped lead to the cultural revitalization movement of the 1980s. Public protests spurred government reforms on language, culture and lands rights issues.

Democratic Period (1996-present): The democratic transition brought about favorable legislation for indigenous peoples, including the eight-year Aboriginal Development Program, the Aboriginal Education Bill, the White Paper on Aboriginal Policy, the Law on Aboriginal Identity and the Aboriginal Workers Rights Protection Law. Efforts to revitalize indigenous culture have included certification programs to train teachers in local languages and the creation of the Indigenous Television Channel. Indigenous languages are now being taught in schools, at special centers offering free weekend classes, and at newly formed summer camps.

Taiwan’s efforts to preserve the cultural traditions of its indigenous inhabitants are commendable, but some critics contend that they are too little and too late. In addition to supporting democracy and cultural identity, the government is driven by less-than-altruistic motives, such as attracting tourism and justifying the independence movement. Blundell postulates that the presence of indigenous people can serve as a “tool for socio-political communication and identification of Taiwan with other Austronesian speaking peoples” that populate independent nations such as New Zealand, Palau and the Solomon Islands. Although the democratic period has seen significant change, only time will tell how much can be done to reverse the cultural degradation that Taiwan’s indigenous groups have suffered.

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Instability in Ecuador

In mid-October 2010, Ecuador’s political vulnerability was once again highlighted as disgruntled police held President Rafael Correa “practically captive,” wrecking havoc in the nation of 14.5 million people. On September 30^th, Ecuadorian police protested against salary cuts passed in Congress by overtaking barracks and shutting down airports. The initial pay cuts were designed to reduce the nation’s $3.5 billion budget deficit. President Correa tried to quell the protests by directly addressing the officers, but only sparked greater resistance by speaking angrily. Police officers responded by throwing tear-gas and physically assaulting the president, who was then taken to the local police hospital. The hospital was soon surrounded by Correa’s adversaries. Ecuadorian military personnel thus had to storm the hospital to rescue the President, resulting in a clash between the military and police forces. Upon his release, Correa declared a state of emergency, placing the military in control of basic law enforcement.

The conflict, which President Correa declared as “an attempt at a coup d’état” signals Ecuador’s relative instability. Prior to Rafael Correa’s election in 2006, Ecuador went through eight different presidencies in 15 years. Despite such political volatility, Ecuador seemed to becoming more stable after it gained a new constitution in September 2008. While opponents had criticized the proposed constitution for increasing presidential power, it was approved in a national referendum with 65 percent of the vote. The new constitution also allowed President Correa to run for another two terms. In 2009, shortly after his victory on the constitution, President Correa was easily reelected – the first presidential win in 30 years that did not require a run-off election. Correa’s popularity, some assert, has led him to act arrogantly at times. At one point during his confrontation with the police, Correa challenged the dissenters to kill him as he stood before them.

Correa’s leftist views and ties with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have polarized the nation, and the split is likely to grow as he makes accusations about those involved in the police revolt. Correa maintains the police revolt is the work of former President Lucio Gutierrez of the Patriotic Society Party (PSP). Gutierrez was forced out in 2005, “following massive protests in response to his attempt to overhaul the Supreme Court.” Gutierrez, however, maintains his innocence, and no charges have been brought against him. Furthermore, President Correa even asserted elements within the extreme right in the U.S. may have helped financed the rebellion. Such accusations are likely to further increase the wedge between Correa and his political opponents.

Other Ecuadorian opposition leaders have united in support of Correa. Jaime Nebot, the mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest and richest city, voiced his support for the president. Nebot, however, has become Correa’s most prominent opponent in recent years. He has a 90% popularity rating in Guayaquil, and he is largely credited with helping the city become “a model of urban renewal.” Highly vocal, Nebot has in previous years led anti-Correa protests. Prior to the passage of the new constitution, he was quoted as saying, "If the government does something good I do not oppose that but if they seek to destroy Guayaquil and if the president wants to become an emperor ... then I will fiercely oppose that.” The diverging views between Ecuador’s best-known political figures indicates the country’s main political division, that which separates the coastal city of Guayaquil, the business hub of the nation, and the highland capital Quito, where the President’s palace is located. Nebot’s support for Correa in the recent weeks probably indicates his desire to maintain stability so that business can continue to function smoothly.

Rafael Correa has capitalized on the unrest by garnering a wave of support. His popularity is likely to rise in the short-term, and he has already vowed to use the events to further strengthen his presidency. He recently promised to “deepen and radicalize the citizen’s revolution.” If successful in this endeavor, Correa may try to link Ecuador more closely to Venezuela.

God Save the Queen - And Her Inflated Overseas Defence Budget Too

“For God’s sake, act like Britain!” exploded an irate American Secretary of State Dean Rusk to his British counterpart in 1968, upon being informed of Britain’s intent to pull out of its colonies “east of Suez.” Mr. Rusk appears finally to be getting his wish – if a bit posthumously.

As European governments slash military spending with a ferocious zeal typically reserved for obnoxious cheering at top-flight football matches, Britain appears once again to be cherishing its perennial position as the English exception to the European rule. As The Economist reported last week, the odd LibDem-Conservative bedfellows currently charged with running the country appear to have traded Britain’s time-honored practice of offering its students free education for a pair of brand-new aircraft carriers and the continuation of the Trident nuclear submarine program. While some cuts are inevitable in the wake of the global financial crisis – the British defense budget will be cut by approximately eight percent this year – Tory Prime Minister David Cameron has nevertheless promised that the United Kingdom shall “remain one of a ‘very few’ powers able to deploy a brigade-sized force anywhere on earth, indefinitely.”

James Bond might approve - but will the British public? Surprisingly, the answer appears to be a resounding yes (or perhaps even “jolly good.”) A poll commissioned by British-based think-tank Chatham House revealed recently that the British public considers the armed forces, along with the BBC, to be the asset that “best serves Britain globally.” As The Economist’s Bagehot editorialized last week: “Whereas defence is an elite preoccupation in many European countries, in Britain it is the general public that is keen on hard power” – an attitude borne out by Britain’s seemingly odd commitment to overseas territories far from the imperial center. The South Atlantic News Agency reported yesterday, for example, that British forces in the faraway Falkland Islands, the site of a brief 1982 war between Great Britain and Argentina, remain “ready for any crisis… including external aggression.” (Given recent speculations in the London-based Telegraph about a possible invasion of the islands by a covert Argentine commando force, it isn’t hard to see where such “external aggression” might come from.)

Controversial British military bases on the onetime colonial isle of Cyprus, meanwhile, have escaped the budget cuts entirely, as reported in the Cyprus Mail – leaving the British Overseas Territories of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, sovereign British military bases on the island’s southeastern coast, more or less intact. (Britain has held the island, or parts of it, almost uninterruptedly since 1877, though most of Cyprus was granted independence in 1960). Despite sweeping fiscal austerity measures across the board, Britain’s longtime colonial and military outposts look like they’re here to stay – at least for the moment.

But why, with the rest of Europe apparently content to let the United States play Atlas with regards to global security, is Great Britain, a relatively small island nation seemingly more likely to launch internationally bestselling wizardry franchises than ballistic missiles, refusing to do the same? A brief foray into the history and geography of British foreign involvement, however, suggests that Britain may still be clinging to the legacy of Churchill, the legend of T.E. Lawrence, and the tatters of its once-glorious imperial mantle – and it might even help explain the sentiments behind Hugh Grant’s famous oratorical rebuke to Billy Bob Thornton in Love Actually.

Use of the British Army to preserve order in the former imperial colonies, and of the Royal Navy (the world’s largest during the 18^th and 19^th centuries) to patrol the world’s seas, was common. As early as 1754, the British waged a titanic worldwide struggle against archrival France in the Seven Years’ War, during which they seized the crucial French sugar-producing isles of Guadeloupe and Martinique (only to return them in exchange for significant portions of French North America). In 1757, British forces under Sir Robert Clive maneuvered themselves to victory over the Nawab of Bengal at the landmark Battle of Plassey, heralding the inception of a century of gradual conquest in what would eventually become British India under the Raj. In 1806, the British seized Cape Town from the Dutch as a base from which to thwart Napoleonic influence in the Indian Ocean; beginning in the 1840s, Britain deployed regulars against the Maori in the New Zealand Land Wars (the genesis of modern trench warfare); British gunboat diplomacy brought Qing China to its knees in a series of enforced unequal treaties (see the Treaty of Nanjing, 1842); and British espionage specialists vied for control of Central Asia in the “Great Game” against Russia throughout the 19^th century.

British imperialism may perhaps have reached its apogee during the infamous “Scramble for Africa,” given shape at the Berlin Conference of 1884, in which European nations raced to carve up the furthest reaches of the “Dark Continent” in a battle for national pride and economic autarky. In southern Africa, British empire-builder, diamond magnate, and “Cape-to-Cairo” visionary Cecil Rhodes expanded British influence into the Boer Republics and the eponymous colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Following the “Great Boer War” of 1898-1902, during which the British pioneered the use of concentration camps against Afrikaner men, women, and children, the U.K. assumed control of what would eventually become the resource-rich nation of South Africa, complementing its existing outposts in Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, and Bechuanaland (Botswana). British acquisition of Germany’s former colonies in Africa, and of its so-called “League of Nations mandates” in the Middle East, following the First World War enhanced what had by then become, on many counts, the most influential empire the world had ever seen. Connected after October 1902 by the so-called All-Red Line (a telegraph network that effectively extended around the globe, augmented by British insular possessions at Ascension Island, Mauritius, St. Helena, and Fiji), the Empire was both a formidable economic resource abroad and a source of pride to the British public at home, steeped in the legendary stories of heroic explorers like Charles “China” Gordon, Sir Henry Morton Stanley, and T.E. Lawrence. Only with the economic devastation wreaked by the First and Second World Wars did Britain’s long-held overseas empire begin to slip away, wrested from its grasp by a long, slow decline in geopolitical and military influence that continues in some respects to this day.

In light of Britain’s long history of global prominence, however, it should perhaps be no surprise that Britain, in the words of The Economist, still wants both “guns and butter” – and that Britons remain doubtful about massive reductions in the national defense budget, preferring, as the Chatham poll revealed, to preserve a fading image of their nation as the “great power” it once was.

Coca Eradication and its Cultural Price Tag

With only 1,200 remaining members, the Tule tribe of northwestern Colombia is facing a threat to its survival. In recent months, the tribe has been driven out of its native lands as a result of the Colombian government’s aggressive attack on coca growing. The Tule are not alone. Last month, the New York Times reported that “more than 40 percent of the country’s 84 distinct indigenous groups are now at risk of extinction… because of the pressures of the country’s long running internal armed conflict, which is fueled partly by the cocaine trade.”

The eradication of coca, a plant used both as a traditional stimulant by indigenous groups in the Andes and to manufacture cocaine, has become highly controversial because of its environmental and socioeconomic impact. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have seen the large-scale burning, cutting, and chemically fumigating of much of their coca growing regions. The land is devastated, but the demand for coca remains. Planters simply abandon their old plots to move deeper into the forest, where they clear new lands for cultivation. The resulting deforestation, combined with the soil erosion and chemical contamination caused by eradication, make for serious environmental degradation in coca producing zones.

Colombia has seen the most aggressive attacks on coca cultivation, which usually entails fumigation—the aerial spraying of herbicides over coca fields. Colombia is the only country that allows such aerial sprayings, which have been lambasted by environmentalists and human rights activists because its impact on soil, water systems, and human health.

The dangers to health posed by fumigation have been most clearly seen on the Aponte Indian Reservation. According to one report,, eighty percent of the children here fell ill with diarrhea, fever, and infections of the skin and eyes as a result of the spraying in 2000. As Sanho Tree, the director of the Institute for Policy Studies Drug Policy Project, argues:

"The U.S. has supplied tens of thousands of gallons of Roundup to the Colombian government for use in aerial fumigation of coca crops. We have been using a fleet of crop dusters to dump unprecedented amounts of high-potency glyphosate over hundreds of thousands of acres in one of the most delicate and bio-diverse ecosystems in the world. This futile effort has done little to reduce the availability of cocaine on our streets, but now we are learning that a possible side effect of this campaign could be the unleashing of a Fusarium epidemic in the Amazon basin. The drug war has tried in vain to keep cocaine out of people's noses, but could result instead in scorching the lungs of the earth."

Aerial fumigation of coca has been highly contentious in Colombia. The Superior Administrative Court of the Colombian department of Cundinamarca ordered the end of of the practice in 2003, as part a series of mandates to protect the environment and public health. The court’s decision to stop fumigation, however, was quickly overruled by the Colombian State Council, the country’s highest administrative authority, perhaps with a strong monetary incentive in mind: the United States to eradicate coca cultivation. US has provided Colombia with almost US $6 billion in aid over the last decade, mostly through Plan Colombia (aimed both at curbing drug smuggling and quashing left wing insurgencies).

In 2003, 60 percent of the world’s cocaine came from Colombia. Many believed that coca the eradication program in Colombia would lead to higher production in Peru and Bolivia. But in 2005, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that the total area dedicated to coca production had remained unchanged. The Washington Office on Latin America, which studies the effects of US foreign policy in Latin America, attributed the seeming puzzle to the so-called balloon effect: aggressive spraying simply led to increased cultivation in other parts of the country.

School Integration no Simple Task in Northern Ireland

It has been over a decade since the signing of the "Good Friday Agreement," the 1998 peace accord that is often credited with ending "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland. Yet despite the peace, tension persists between Northern Irish Protestants and Catholics.

In mid-October, 2010, such tensions again made news when First Minister of Northern Ireland Peter Robinson called for an end to de facto religious school segregation. Currently, the large majority of Protestant children attend state-run schools, whereas most Catholics attend parochial school. A few dozen specially created schools provide integrated education, but they enroll only about 5 percent of Northern Irish pupils.

Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland

Robinson's support for school integration was not the sole cause of controversy. More troubling for Catholics was the fact that he advocated withdrawing public funding for religious schools. As he put it, "I don't in any way object to churches providing and funding schools for those who choose to use them. What I do object to is the state providing and funding church schools."

Many Catholics have fired back, taking the comments as a thinly-veiled attack on their religion.

"The DUP do not seek an integrated education system, they seek the end of the Catholic education sector, there is a difference," said John O'Dowd, a Sinn Fein Assembly member.

Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness also responded to Robinson's comments, albeit in a more diplomatic manner. "If Peter thinks taking on the Catholic Church, the Catholic bishops and indeed the Protestant churches for that matter and other interest groups is a sensible route to go, I think that is a big mistake," he said.

To understand why the issue is so contentious, it is necessary to examine the politics, history and geography of Northern Ireland. The executive arm of the country is a "diarchy," with power split equally between the First Minister (Robinson, from the Democratic Unionist Party) and the deputy First Minister (McGuinness, from Sinn Fein). The DUP and Sinn Fein are the two biggest parties, the former being advocating continued union with Great Britain and the latter hoping to join Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. Interestingly, they are both more radical versions of the two parties that were dominant a decade ago -- the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, respectively. It is difficult to judge how this polarization has affected Northern Irish politics as a whole, but it certainly demonstrates an increased possibility for tension between Northern Irish voters.


Along with political shifts, demographic changes have also created tension. In the past decades, the Catholic population of Northern Ireland has been slowly rising, from 37% in 1971 to 44% in 2001. In the capital, Belfast, which has over 15% of the country's population, the Catholic population has increased from 34% to 47% in the same period. The next census will be significant, as many Nationalists believe that a Catholic majority in Northern Ireland will lead to the eventual re-unification of the island.


When this uncertainty over the future is combined with historical grievances, issues such as religious education can take on great importance. However the government addresses school segregation, clearly it will have to tread very lightly.

A Relationship on the Brink: Pakistan and the United States

While the Torkham border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan may have reopened on October 10^th, the preceding ten-day period in which NATO supplies were prohibited from crossing into war torn Afghanistan illustrates the predicament the United States faces in its dealings with the Pakistani government. Not only are the supply lines that run from the port of Karachi into Afghanistan essential to the American-lead war effort, but the U.S. also finds itself dependent on Pakistani military action in that country’s tribal areas, where Taliban and other insurgent forces that take refuge there and coordinate attacks against NATO forces within Afghanistan. Since the start of the war in Afghanistan, the United States government has continually urged the Pakistani government to do more in its fight against the Taliban and other insurgent networks, like the Haqqani Network, but with little success. According to an October 7^th, 2010 Voice of America article, the United States has poured 15 billion dollars of aid into Pakistan since the onset of the war in 2001. Such funding has been designed not only to equip and train the Pakistani military to conduct counter-insurgency operations, but also to strengthen Islamabad’s control over its border regions.

Despite its acceptance of U.S. military aid, Pakistan has been reluctant to launch large-scale operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas against the Haqqani network and the Taliban. Pakistan’s disinclination to fight such groups has strained the relationship between the two nations. As the war in Afghanistan continues to drag on, Pakistan’s inaction is increasingly blamed. The fact that militants can launch attacks against coalition forces and then slip across the border into effective sanctuaries in Pakistan continues to thwart NATO’s efforts to quell the insurgency. Mounting U.S. frustration with Islamabad has contributed to the sharp increase in the number of drone strikes within the tribal areas in the last few months and ultimately to the recent cross border aerial assault by American forces on suspected insurgents inside of Pakistan. These suspected combatants turned out to be Pakistani border troops. This blatant violation of Pakistani sovereignty coupled with the wrongful deaths of Pakistani soldiers prompted the Pakistani government to take the step of closing the border crossing at Torkham.

Pakistan’s closing of the border was aimed both demonstrate to the U.S. its dependence on Pakistan as a supply hub and ally, and to illustrate Islamabad’s independence from Washington and its anger over such territorial violations. Although it is widely acknowledged that Pakistani government secretly coordinates and supports many of the drone attacks by American forces inside of Pakistan, the deaths of the frontier guards demanded an official response. Nationalist elements within the country bitterly oppose what they see as Pakistan’s subservience to the U.S. As such anti-American sentiments gain strength, the increasingly unpopular government of Pakistan felt compelled to act.

This growing tension between the United States and Pakistan is likely to remain in the news in the near future. While this particular incident was seemingly resolved by the largely symbolic closing of the border for a short period, the underlying issue of Pakistan’s reluctance to engage militant forces in the tribal areas is not likely to be resolved in such an easy manner. To help alleviate this unwillingness on the part of the Pakistani’s, the Obama Administration announced on October 21^st an additional two billion dollars in military aid to Pakistan over the next five years. This aid is meant to demonstrate America’s commitment to the Pakistani government, and yet in spite of the vast amount of aid that the U.S. continues to distribute there, Pakistan appears to be close to chaos. Considering the horrific floods that devastated much of the country in August 2010, it is ill prepared to launch a major military operation into the tribal areas in the near future. And unless something is done to address the growing American frustration, similar border incidents are likely to continue happening into the future.

Somaliland's Road to Recognition of Independence-Through Democracy?

Somalia may bring to mind chaos, disorder, and civil war among other images. Somalia itself is a failed state whose government, supported by the African Union, controls little more than part of Mogadishu, the capital city. Mogadishu is extraordinary violent and dangerous, as demonstrated by a “tourist guide” to the city that advises would-be visitors to stock up on street militias for protection. The northern part of Somalia, however, is a relatively peaceful “country” with a small but viable tourist industry.

Somaliland's independence stems from its history as a British colony as opposed to the rest of Somalia, which was controlled by Italy as Italian Somaliland (see map at left.) When colonization ended in 1960, British Somaliland voted to join Italian Somaliland to form the country of Somalia. After independence, Somalia eventually succumbed to military dictatorship under President (and General) Said Barre. When President Barre was ousted in 1991, Somalia descended into civil war. During this period, former British Somaliland declared its independence as Somaliland. However, despite its relative stability, Somaliland has not been recognized as independent by any foreign government.

Somaliland has been functioning as a relatively peaceful democracy since its independence. The country held presidential elections in 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2005, and intends on holding elections every five years. Presidential elections were thus scheduled for 2008 and parliamentary elections for 2010.

The planned presidential election for 2008 got off to such a rocky start that it had to be put off until 2010. On several occasions, the government announced that Somaliland was not ready to hold an election. Such delays threatened the peace of the country. In the end, however, the elections did run surprisingly smoothly, helped by Denmark, which donated the necessary ballot boxes.

The biggest surprise for outside observers was not so much the peaceful and free election, but how the results were handled. The opposition party (Peace, Unity, and Development Party), headed by Ahmed Silanyo, won the election with 49.59% of the vote, defeating the incumbent Dahir Kahin, who received 33.23% of the vote (also see chart at right). The election itself was run smoothly with little evidence of fraud. Once the results were announced, former President Kahin made the unusual step, for the leader of such a poor country, of gracefully transferring power to the opposition. So despite the many delays and election controversies, Somaliland’s 2010 presidential contest is generally regarded as a clear success.

As Somaliland is not recognized as a sovereign state, the main goal of its leaders is recognition, and the new President Silanyo is not an exception. The clean presidential election impressed many leaders around the world, helping Somaliland's diplomatic quest. The new British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron stated in Parliament that Somaliland is "an example of genuine democracy in an area of the world not noted for it … we are keen to engage with the new Government." The election thus boosted Somaliland's international reputation.

Many challenges still await Somaliland. Scheduled parliamentary elections have been delayed, as the government once again claims that it is not ready. The path to Somaliland’s recognition has numerous obstacles including the African Union’s reluctance to recognize former colonial borders as a reason for newly created states. However, overtures from non-African countries such as the United States looking to ally with Somaliland against Islamist terrorists and Somali pirates may be a step towards recognition of Somaliland as an independent country.

Peace at Last? After 25 years of violence, Ethiopia signs peace treaty with Ogaden rebel faction

The 400,000 square kilometer territory called Ogaden, Ethiopia's most underdeveloped periphery, is marked by conflicting identities: it falls in the southeast portion of the Somali Regional State. It is home to eight million ethnic Somalis who speak the Somali language and practice Islam. These inhabitants refer to their land as "Somali Galbeed," translating to “Western Somalia.” Yet the territory is in and is governed by Ethiopia, a mostly Christian country in which Amharic is the dominant language. The product of this mismatch has been decades of instability, guerrilla uprisings, and rebel faction fighting. However, on October 12, 2010, the Ethiopian government signed a peace deal with the Ogaden National Liberation Front, the main separatist group seeking an independent state. After 25 years of bloodshed, the rebels denounced violence, ending the insurgency, at least for the time being, and perhaps establishing the first steps to peace in the Ogaden region.

As is the case through much of Africa, Ogaden’s troubles stems from colonial and postcolonial land disputes. In 1936, the Ogaden Somali territory was annexed to Italian Somaliland after Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia. In 1941, the British defeated Italy in the horn of Africa and reestablished Ethiopian independence. Britain administered Ogaden for eight years until transferring it to Ethiopia in the mid 1950s. Despite differences in language, ethnicity, and culture, the people of Ogaden found themselves under Ethiopian rule. Irredentists seeking separation from Ethiopia and union with Somalia soon began a campaign of sporadic guerilla activity, which led to the creation of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali separatist rebel group.

In 1977 and 1978, Somalia and Ethiopia fought a conventional conflict over the disputed Ogaden region. During the 1970s, Ethiopia was marked by political turmoil following the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, while Somalia, under the auspices of Soviet and Egyptian military aid, strengthened militarily and politically. Aligning itself with the WSLF, the Somali National Army invaded Ogaden and fought a six-month war against the US-backed Ethiopia over the region and its people. However, with the rise of the Communist Derg in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union switched from supplying aid to Somalia to supporting Ethiopia, prompting the US to support Somalia. The war concluded with Somali defeat and withdrawal, as well as the birth of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which replaced WSLF in the Ogaden territory.

The ONLF has been operating in Ogaden, since the 1980s, seeking self-determination and autonomy from the Ethiopian government. Its objectives differ from other Somali nationalist movements, which have sought a Greater Somalia including all Somali–speaking or Islamic populations. Militarily, the ONLF has focused on ambushes, guerilla-style raids against Ethiopian troops, kidnappings of foreign workers presumed to support Ethiopia’s government, and bombings in major Ethiopian cities. One of the greatest sources of contention between the central government and the ONLF has been over the presence of energy companies in the region; the ONLF refuses to allow the exploration of oil and gas in the area until it gains independence.

The ONLF guerrilla campaign started making national headlines three years ago, when a surge in violence sparked an Ethiopian crackdown. In early 2007, the ONLF killed hundreds of civilians in a series of terrorist attacks: a grenade attack on a cultural gathering in Jijiga killed four middle school students; an attack on the town of Debeweyin killed ten civilians; an ONLF-planted landmine in Aware in the Degehabur Zone killed three. The deadliest attack occurred on April 24^th, when ONLF gunmen attacked a Chinese firm working on a 21,000-square oilfield in Abole about 120 kilometers (75 miles) from Jijiga.

The attack killed 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese workers. In response, the Ethiopian government imposed a blockade to prevent supplies from reaching the rebels across the porous Ethiopia-Somalia border region. In addition, the government initiated a major counter-insurgency operation, calling on local leaders to mobilize their clans to form militias and destroy the rebel faction. The crisis attracted widespread attention both to the immediate region and greater East Africa. Human rights groups have accused the Ethiopian government of war crimes for killing hundreds of Ogaden civilians, while blaming the ONLF for massacres of non-Ogaden Somalis and for using civilians as human shield. The UN and international community have also criticized Ogaden’s neighbors, Eritrea and Somalia, for fueling the conflict by backing rebel groups financially and militarily.

Violence diminished in 2008 and peace talks began in early 2010 in Washington DC, leading to the signing of the Ethiopian-ONLF peace accord in Addis Ababa on October 12, 2010. The chairman of the ONLF, Salahadin Abdurrahman, announced that the rebel group had learned its lessons, saying, “violence never solves the problems of the people but rather results in a boomerang effect that exacerbates existing difficulties. It is with this understanding that we have decided to sign this agreement.” Abay Tsehaye, national security adviser to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, praised the deal, calling it an “important input toward realizing unity in the Horn of Africa’s country.”

The peace deal, however, is not universally welcomed. ONLF is a factious organization, and Salahadin Abdurrahman’s ONLF contingent may or may not be the main group. Another faction of the ONLF, based in London and led by Mohamed Omar Osman, has vowed to continue fighting. This group, still at war with the Ethiopian government, calls the Salahadin’s faction irrelevant. “They don’t represent anybody and it will not change anything in the Ogaden. The fighting will continue." Osman’s words have raised doubts about the relative significance and sustainability of the deal. This ONLF faction’s influence largely hinges on Eritrea, the country with the highest military expenditures per GDP (20.9%), Ethiopia’s bitter enemy since the border war in 1998-2000, and consistent supporter of Ethiopian rebel forces

Despite possible destabilizing forces, the deal marks an important step towards peace. Ethiopia remains one of America’s important African partners in our counterterrorism efforts, and given recent concerns of Ogaden devolving into an al-Qaeda breeding ground, a stable and secure horn of Africa has become one of Washington’ s top priorities. The recent peace deal will hopefully address this danger by increasing social and economic development in Ethiopia’s poorest region.

- Jaclyn Tandler