The Spread of the AK-47

On November 16, 2010, the Thai police arrested Viktor Bout, the “Merchant of Death” on an Interpol red notice. A notorious international arms trafficker, Bout emerged as one of the pre-eminent dealers in the early 1990s. Officially indicted on charges that Bout sold 5000 AK-47s, 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles, and other weapons to undercover U.S. DEA agents posing as FARC rebels, Bout has a lengthy history of involvement with rogue entities. He has conducted business deals with the likes of Charles Taylor in Liberia, Jean-Pierre Bemba in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda. In cultivating relationships with these authoritarian leaders, Bout’s weapons have remained a persistent factor in terrorism, crime, ethnic cleansing, and local and regional destabilization.

In fact, numerous studies of military small arms have documented their role in perpetuating instability and death. The United Nations convened a conference in 2001 where they noted that small arms were the principal weapons in 46 of the 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, in which 4 million people died. Furthermore, in 2004, Human Rights Watch identified 18 nations where child soldiers are still used—and the overwhelming weapon of choice for these under-aged soldiers is the AK-47, due to its ease of operability. Although the trade of other weapon platforms has declined in the past couple of decades, the sale of small arms has remained persistent. Estimates of the annual legal trade of these arms range between $7 billion and $10 billion. The “illegal” trafficking of small arms is valued around $2 billion to $3 billion a year.

AK-47s are popular weapons in numerous internal conflicts for several reasons. Because they are manufactured in more than 40 countries, these rifles are relatively easy to obtain and can be extremely cheap to purchase. In Angola, it is possible to buy an AK-47 for as little as $15. And as many of these conflicts involve poor militant factions, the cheap price of these small arms makes them attractive. Furthermore, because the gun has few moving parts, it hardly ever jams—giving it an advantage over more sophisticated rifles such as the American M16. It works well in different types of weather: the rain, extreme heat, and the cold. While its accuracy is not always reliable, its ability to fire 600 rounds a minute gives it potency during combat. In one startling anecdote, American soldiers in Vietnam reported that they found AK-47s “buried in rice paddies for six months or more that were filthy and rusted shut” but that still fired perfectly after they “kick[ed] the action bolt with the heel of a boot”. Finally, the weapon’s low weight and durability set it apart in the small arms market.

This proliferation of AK-47s has empowered militias and paramilitary groups to wield power equivalent to or even greater than that of a national military force. For example, in 1989, Charles Taylor and roughly a hundred of his troops stormed the presidential palace and overthrew the government. Then, utilizing the AK-47 as a form of political currency, Taylor promised weapons to anyone who worked to keep him in power. The ability of one soldier to rapidly fire bullets indiscriminately has struck fear in many regions of the world. The AK-47 has been typically utilized not as a tool for liberation but as a tool for hindering freedom movements. It has been the rifle of choice for states to repress any opposition. East German border guards shot unarmed civilians fleeing for West Germany with AK-47s. In uprisings in Prague, in Alma-Ata, in Baku, and in Riga, the AK-47 saw use in silencing freedom. Chinese military soldiers utilized these small arms at Tiananmen ,and Uzbekistan soldiers fired them in the Andijan Massacre of 2005. Innocent Kurds were shot by Iraqi Army soldiers using these weapons. The genocide of Srebrenica also capitalized on the killing efficiency of the AK-47 to kill innocent Bosnian men and boys. While most observers fixated on the threat of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, little attention was given to the proliferation of small arms. However, in the aftermath of the collapse of many Communist states, entrepreneurial minded individuals seized on the opportunity to loot weapons caches or arsenals. This chaotic period allowed for the easy transfer of weapons across the Eastern European bloc all largely hidden from the eyes of the international community. What the international community failed to realize was the impact that these potent weapons would actually hold. Even to this day, arms-control specialists look to the price of AK-47s in a nation’s arms market to determine the degree of destabilization in a land.

Sources include:

1. Chivers, C.J. "The Gun". Simon & Schuster. October 2010.

2. Patrick Herron, Nicolas Marsh, Matt Schroeder, and Jasna Lazarevic. "Small Arms Survey 2010".

The Bipolar Kingdom of Bhutan

Bhutan, the isolated Buddhist kingdom nestled between India and China, is celebrated as a cultural treasure and one of the “happiest” places on earth. Bhutan’s government famously measures success in terms of “Gross National Happiness” instead of Gross National Product. A closer look at the kingdom’s political climate, however, reveals some disturbing realities about the country hailed by many as “the last Shangri-La,” as Bhutan has generated one of the largest numbers of refugees in the world in proportion to its population.

Bhutan’s population encompasses several ethnic groups, including the Lhotshampa, who began to migrate from Nepal in the late 19th century. The Bhutanese government encouraged immigration, hoping to turn lightly populated southern Bhutan into the country’s main food supplier. The number of Nepalese immigrants mushroomed to over 60,000 people by 1930. With annual growth rate of 2 to 3%, Nepalese expatriots constituted nearly half Bhutan’s population by the 1980s. At this time, ethnic Bhutanese and their government began to regard the Lhotshampa as a threat to the political order, precipitating the current crisis. Thousands of southern Bhutanese have been imprisoned and tortured, and more than with 100,000 have been forced into refugee camps in neighboring countries.

The conflict evolved slowly. In 1958, Bhutan passed its first citizenship act, granting the entire Southern Bhutanese population full citizenship and security. The economic importance of the south grew sharply after 1961, as the government promoted major hydro-electric power projects that fueled the Bhutanese economy. Despite economic growth, the old divides endured -- southerners did not settle in the north, and there was very little interaction between two parts of the country until the 1960s, when new social and educational programs encouraged integration. Some Southern Bhutanese citizens even came to occupy influential positions in the bureaucracy.

Efforts toward integration stalled in the 1980s, when the government became alarmed by the growing illegal immigration of Nepalese and the failure of long-term immigrants to acculturate into the country’s political and cultural mainstream. Most immigrants could not understand the local language and knew very little about Bhutanese culture. Seeing these divisions as a threat to Bhutanese unity, the government began to promote the kingdom’s cultural identity with a “One Nation One People” policy. It made Dzonghka the official language while discontinuing Nepali as a school subject. A national dress code public places was instituted, as was the observance of the Dringlam Namzha, the national code of etiquette. Human rights groups criticized the policies as prejudicial to Bhutan's Nepalese migrant community.

In 1988, the government conducted its first real census. Those who could not prove their residency prior to 1958 were classified as illegal immigrants. Untrained census officials often assigned residents to arbitrary categories, ranging from "Genuine Bhutanese" to "Non-nationals, Migrants and Illegal Settlers." In some cases members of the same family received different designations. The chaotic census and the new cultural regulations alienated even bona fide citizens of Nepali descent. The southern border of Bhutan saw intensifying ethnic conflict. The government classified individuals who participated in public demonstrations against the new policies as “anti-nationals.” Several thousand Southern Bhutanese went to prison for many months in awful conditions, usually without trial or formal charges. When released, many found that their families had fled the kingdom and their houses had been destroyed.

The crises climaxed in 1990, when over 10,000 ethnic Nepalese organized by the Bhutan People’s Party marched in protest, burning down schools, attacking government officials, and kidnapping and murdering fellow ethnic Nepalese who refused to join the protest. The government detained some protest leaders, banned the party and deported individuals with ties to the groups responsible for murders and kidnappings. Meanwhile, many innocent Southern Bhutanese of Nepali origin were coerced to flee by hard-line Nepali dissidents.

At first, southern Bhutanese refugees fled to India. When the Indian government turned them back, they moved into eastern Nepal. In Bhutan, repression against suspected dissidents and innocent Southern Bhutanese continued into the early 90s. As the successive annual censuses revoked an increasing number of citizenships, the flow of refugees turned into a cascade, with up to 600 people fleeing per day in mid-1992. By year’s end, nearly 100,000 refugees were living in camps administered by the UNHCR in Nepal’s two southeastern districts.

Of the estimated 100,000 Southern Bhutanese who lost their homes and livelihoods between 1990 and 1993, not a single one has yet been allowed to return. The Bhutanese government coerced thousands of refugees into signing alleged “voluntary migration” certificates, but has tacitly admitted that some of the refugees are in fact bona fide citizens, illegally expelled from Bhutan. Despite frequent governmental meetings, Bhutan has resisted Nepal’s calls for international arbitration and India has refused to take part in what it sees as a bilateral conflict.

Meanwhile, repression in Bhutan continues. Ethnic Nepalese have been dismissed from government service. The southern Bhutanese who remain in Bhutan continue to endure severe discrimination. Since 1991, the government has required southern Bhutanese to carry “No Objection Certificates” stating their non-involvement (as well as that of their families) in any “anti-national” activities. This certificate is almost impossible to obtain, yet is necessary for access to schools, business licenses, and government services.

In 2000, under pressure from the international community, Bhutan and Nepal agreed to commence a “verification exercise,” to screen refugees in one of the camps. The results of the process were announced in 2003: 75% of the refugees in the screened camp were found to be eligible to return to Bhutan, under various conditions described below:
• Category 1 (2.5% people) were eligible to return to Bhutan as citizens, but not to their original houses and lands
• Category 2 (70.5%) would have to reapply for citizenship under the terms of the 1985 Citizenship Act after a probationary period of two years spent in a closed camp in Bhutan.
• Category 3 (24.2%) were termed as Non-Bhutanese. They would have the right to appeal the results of the verification.
• Category 4 (2.8% people) included relatives of those to be charged with criminal acts. They would be detained in a designated camp.

A scuffle among angry and frustrated refugees resulted in injuries to a few Bhutanese members of the verification team. The team returned to Bhutan and the repatriation process has since been stalled.

In 2006 Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk assumed the throne Bhutan. It is not known how his corantation will impact the crisis. The Bhutanese refugees remain nationless and in limbo in their crowded camps.



Hostility and violence between refugees favoring third country resettlement and those who insist on repatriation has become an increasingly serious problem. Meanwhile, some 35,000 Bhutanese refugees still live outside of the camps, in both Nepal and India, without the protection of UNHCR and without offcial status in the countries where they currently reside. The southern Bhutanese who remain in Bhutan also face an uncertain future, with continuing discrimination and the possibility of exclusion from the emerging democratic process outlined in Bhutan’s new constitution.

For those thousands of innocent ethnic Nepalese from southern Bhutan, no end to their tragedy is in sight.

Chinese Lebensraum in the Pacific in the 21st century, Part II

The Paracel Island – The Imperial Frontier

The Paracel Islands are located in the South China Sea. They are composed of more than 30 islets, sandbanks or reefs, and occupy about 15,000 km² of the ocean surface. Both China and Vietnam claim these islands as their territory, but since 1974 they have been occupied by the Chinese Navy. These otherwise uninhabited islands are now garrisoned by a small number of Chinese troops. This archipelago sits over potentially large oil and gas reserves, prompting a territorial dispute between China and Vietnam. In January 1974, South Vietnamese Army officers reported to Saigon that the Chinese Navy was expected to land at two of the larger Paracel Islands. After receiving this report, the South Vietnam sent its Navy and evicted the PRC forces from the islands. The Chinese fleet, however, defeated the naval force of the Republic of Vietnam. During the Vietnamese civil war, the Paracel Islands were not the top priority for either North or South Vietnam. These islands have been administered by the People's Republic of China ever since.

The Spratly Islands – Through a Peaceful solution

The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 750 reefs, islets and islands in the South China Sea. They comprise less than four square kilometers of land, spreading over more than 425,000 square kilometers of sea. About 45 islands are occupied by either the PRC, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam or the Philippines. In addition, Brunei has asked an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on one reef located in the southeastern part of the Spratly island chain. Vietnam claims that many of its old maps include both Paracels and the Spratly Islands as Vietnamese territory, and some of the texts written in the 17th century indicate government-sponsored economic activities around this area. In 1933, France reasserted its long-standing claims dating back to 1887, over both archipelagos on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam. It occupied a number of the Spratly Islands, which was strongly protested by the Republic of China. In 1935, the ROC government also claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Even though Japan occupied some of the islands during World War II, it renounced all claims in compliance with the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The naval units of the Vietnamese government took over the islands after the defeat of the French at the end of the First Indochina War. In 1958, the People's Republic of China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters, which encompassed the entire Spratly group.

Following the 1995 dispute between China and the Philippines, an ASEAN-brokered agreement was reached between the PRC and ASEAN member nations. According to this agreement, any participant country would inform the others of any military movement within the disputed territory; it also stipulated that no further construction would be allowed. The agreement was, however, promptly violated during the dispute between China and Malaysia. Claiming storm damage, seven Chinese naval vessels entered this area to repair “fishing shelters.” The Philippines staged formal protests, demanded the removal of the structures, increased naval patrols and invited American politicians to inspect the PRC bases by airplane. In the 21^st century, China and ASEAN countries have been engaged in talks to create a code of conduct with an aim to easing tensions surrounding these disputed Islands. On March 2002, an agreement was reached, which sets forth the willingness of the concerned nations to resolve the problem of sovereignty in the South China Sea without further use of force. In November 2002, a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed, which resulted in easing tensions, but fell far short of a legally binding code of conduct.

Chinese Lebensraum in the Pacific in the 21^st century

In 2000, the PRC released its Defense White Paper and Taiwan White Paper, where it warned that “If Taiwan seek independence..……PRC cannot help choosing every possible alternatives, use of force is including”. In addition, according to Military Power of the People’s Republic of China issued in 2009 and 2010, the US DoD’s annual report to Congress, the PRC military perceives the two “island chains” as forming a geographic basis for China’s maritime defensive perimeter. The first island chain encompasses the entire areas of East China Sea and South China Sea, including Taiwan, of course, the Korean peninsula and some part of Japan. The second island chain covers most of the West Pacific. Chinese navy strategists believe that these two chains are essential for the security of their country, and sooner or later they will formally request the international community, including the U.S., to recognize these areas as falling within the Chinese sphere of influence. Such actions can be interpreted as China’s declaration of new Lebensraum in the Pacific area in the latter half of the 21^st century.

In the same vein, the DoD has stated in the report that China is developing a land-based Anti-ship Ballistic Missile based on the DF (Dong Feng)-21, with a range of up to 3,000km. The report added that this would be the world’s first and only weapons system capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike group from long range, land-based mobile launchers. The PRC’s installation of advanced ASBM means that the aircraft carrier strike group of U.S. Seventh Fleet, stationed in Japan, will not be able to enter the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea if Taiwan were to be invaded or the Spratly conquered by another country.

Sources:

1)Google, Wikipedia

2)Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the PRC 2010 (Office of Secretary of Defense)

3)A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Office of Naval Intelligence)

4) China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Capability (Project 2049 Institute)

5) Jane’s Defense Review

6) Global Military Report

7) The Chosun Ilbo (Korean), The Asahi Shinbun (Japanese)