Chinese Lebensraum in the Pacific in the 21^st century, Part I

On Oct. 24, 2010, South Korea’s Ministry of Defense cancelled a planned joint military exercise engaging the 97,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier, USS George Washington of the U.S. Seventh Fleet - whose operational range is around 1,000 kilometers, and which covers most of Chinese Northern area including Beijing. South Korean officials justified the cancellation on the basis that the joint exercise could aggravate military tensions in the region while undermining South Korea’s endeavors to successfully host the G20 summit slated for Nov.11-12 in Seoul. South Korea and the U.S. have recently conducted joint maritime maneuvers and plan to stage additional exercises in 2010 in response to the March 26 sinking of the corvette Cheonan by North Korean torpedo, which took the lives of 46 South Korean sailors.

The biggest beneficiary of this cancellation is neither the citizens of Seoul, who are hoping for the success of G20 Summit, nor North Korea, which is preoccupied with idolizing its 26 year-old prospective leader, but rather China. China has persistently complained about the Korea-U.S. joint exercises conducted in the “international water” of the Yellow Sea. China has warned the United States and South Korea against holding the war games near its territorial seas, claiming that these activities will aggravate tensions with its long-standing ally, North Korea. China’s foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang once said "China has expressed its serious concerns with the relevant parties," adding that, "We are firmly opposed to foreign military vessels engaging in activities that undermine China's security interests in the Yellow Sea or waters close to China."

On Oct. 25, 2010, A Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary announced that Tokyo lodged a protest with Beijing through diplomatic channels over the new movement of Chinese fisheries patrol boats near the Senkaku Islands (Daoyudao in Chinese). He said that the Japanese Coast Guard found two Chinese patrol boats sailing night near the uninhabited islets in the East China Sea. On Sep. 24, 2010, the dispute stemming from Japan's arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat over collisions with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats pulled the diplomatic ties between the two Asian giants to their lowest point in the decades. In response to Japan's arrest of the Chinese captain, China enacted a set of tough measures against Japan, including restricting the exports of rare earths, tightening customs clearance procedures, and pressuring travel agencies to suspend planned trips to Japan. Still, China claims that it is exercising restraint, claiming that it only used economic measures. But if Japan tries to vigorously demonstrate its effective control over the islands, China might carry out its claim in a more forceful way.

The panda, some would say, is transforming itself to a great white shark. The main target of this hungry shark could be the nearest boat. Traditionally, China, sharing its 22,147 kilometer-long border with 14 countries, has experienced disputes and skirmishes with land-based powers, such as India, Russia, and even Vietnam. China now enjoys relatively close relationship with Russia, sharing membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the southern areas, India is still a potential rival, but China and India are now both focused more on economic cooperation. In the ocean, however, China officially has three territorial disputes, the one with Japan over the Senkaku (or Daoyudao) Islands, one with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, and the one with other ASEAN countries over the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea. Today’s post will focus on the Senkaku Islands; the other disputes will be considered later.

The Senkaku Islands, also known as the Diaoyu Islands (in Chinese) or the Pinnacle Islands (in English), are a group of uninhabited islands uninhabited island in the East China. Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim the islands as their own territory. Control of these islands has been one of the most contentious issues in East Asian geopolitics since the end of World War II. Japan had occupied the Senkaku islets from 1895 until the Japanese surrender to the U.S. in 1945. The United States then administered the little archipelago through its Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands from 1945 until 1972. In 2972, Okinawa, along with the Senkaku, reverted to Japan. Both China and Taiwan claim the islands on the basis of their alleged discovery by Ming Empire’s Navy: the term ‘daoyudao’ was officially used in 1863 on a Chinese version of world map published by the Qing Dynasty, where the islands were described as falling under the control of Fu-Jien (Fujian) Province. China argues that Japan illegally annexed these Chinese islands during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japan claims that the islands were the part of Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa), and after the annexation of Ryukyu to Japan in 1879, Ryukyu fishermen stopped to use the islands as a shelter for maritime rescue, and they became uninhabited ones. In 1895, Japan occupied and publicly annexed the Senkaku islands without objection from the international community at the time, Japan claims, China voiced no opposition. Japan insists that the PRC and Taiwan started to claim the islands only after natural gas deposits were discovered in 1969. As the Senkaku had been under the U.S .Civil Administration of the Ryukyu from 1945 until 1972, Tokyo claims, they are rightfully Japanese territory. To better stake it claims, Japan has been managing a lighthouse on one of the islets since 2005.

The second part of my blog will cover the disputes over the Paracel, the Spratley and Chinese First and Second Islands chains for its security. Posted by Kim Kwang Woo.

Yemen: A Country Running Dry

In the aftermath of the failed October 29^th cargo plane bombings by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, much of the international world’s attention has been shifted to Yemen, which has become a refuge for terrorism and by most accounts is heading towards state failure. Lost in the international scrutiny and condemnation of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s inability to prevent such attacks, are two key factors that will increasingly limit Yemen’s ability to combat such organizations as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: its rapidly diminishing oil reserves and the gross over exploitation of its potable water supplies.

By nearly all measures, Yemen is the poorest nation in the Middle East. According to the 2009 International Monetary Fund’s rankings, it ranks 140^th on the global list of per capita Gross Domestic Product, with only 1,061 dollars per citizen per year. Unlike its neighboring states of Saudi Arabia and Oman, Yemen has limited reserves of fossil fuels. Yemen does possess some proven oil reserves, but according to a U.S. Energy Information Administration report, exploitation of its oilfields peaked in 2001 at 440,00 barrels per day and has been in steady decline ever since The expected depletion date is 2017.

Although it does not possess nearly as much oil as compared to its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemeni central government is equally as reliant on oil revenues.According to the 2010 CIA Factbook, oil accounts for 70% of the government’s revenue and 25% of the country’s GDP as a whole. Although the pro-western central Yemeni government under President Saleh maintains full control only over the capital city of Sana’a and its environs, such control is directly tied to the revenue received from oil production. As Yemeni fossil fuel production continues to decline, the central government’s revenue declines apace. It is therefore a near certainty that the government will be forced to reduce its military and counter-terrorism budget. Unless foreign countries dramatically increase their military aid to Yemen in the near future, the Sana’a government will become increasingly unable to fund counter-terrorist operations within the country’s rural areas, creating a haven for such groups as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

An equally severe problem faced by the government of Yemen is the growing scarcity of water, especially around Sana’a. According to a February 2010 Reuters Article, Yemen’s capital may become the first capital city in the world to run out of water. Sana’a has experienced a rapid population boom over the last two decades, its population more than doubling to reach the current level of two million. This population explosion has resulted in the gross over-exploitation of the region’s already limited potable water supply. This population growth,coupled with the massive amount of water devoted to qat (a water-demanding, mildly narcotic plant that is a staple of Yemini culture) has resulted in the depletion of local aquifers.According to one report, most wells in the Sana’a area must now be drilled nearly a kilometer deep merely to reach the ever-receding water table, resulting in ever increasing costs. And as Sana’a and Yemen as a whole continue to experience rapid population growth, and as qat cultivation and consumption increase, the problem is worsening. Most estimates hold that unless demand is drastically lowered and sustainable water practices are enacted, Sana’a will fully deplete its local aquifers within the next fifteen years, creating millions of “water refugees” who could potentially overwhelm neighboring countries.

The government of Yemen must address these two fast-approaching crises of oil depletion and ground water depletion in order to stave off collapse, much less to effectively combat extremist organizations. Both problems are immensely challenging, and unless the international community dramatically increases its support of Yemen, this strategically important nation is likely headed towards a future of chaos and instability.

Tonga: A Bright Tropical Future?

Few people can place the archipelagic nation of Tonga on a world map, but this little country merits notice. A long history of successful public education puts the Kingdom of Tonga near the top of the world educational chart with a nearly 99 per cent literacy rate. Universal access to health care and other public welfare programs make Tonga seem superficially like a modern socialist state. Yet in 2007 Tonga was listed by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries, with a lower ranking than turbulent Afghanistan, Chad, and Sudan. But with recent governmental overhaul, Tonga is at last making progress here as well. As a result, we might be seeing a true political and economic success story in the making.

In September 2006, King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV died at the age of 88, an event that set in motion a host of changes that bode well for the country's economic future and the well-being of it's citizens. Late in his 41 year reign, the former king was embattled by an investment scandals with his court jester, press censorship, and striking state workers, sparking a public backlash against royal authority. Jesse Bogdonoff, the former official court jester and banker, mismanaged or siphoned off approximately $20m of the Tonga Trust Fund, finally settling the legal dispute in 2004. In May 2008, the current King, George Tupou V, relinquished most of his position's powers, excepting judicial oversight of the courts. As he explained in a BBC interview: “We've just authorized an independent commission to go through the laws and see which laws have to be amended...and the [answer] appears to be to keep a unicameral chamber and to increase substantially the number of people's representatives who would then...form a government.”

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7535950.stm

On November 25^th 2010, Tonga will be holding its first elections as a newly democratized constitutional monarchy. The parliament will be made up of 26 seats, with a specific number of seats for each island region. 17 of the candidates will be popularly elected MPs, while 9 nobles will be selected from among the royal line. This popularly elected majority is a vast increase from the 2008 parliament, which had only 9 elected officials out of 31 seats. So far, election preparations seem to be running smoothly, with over 147 candidates contending for office. A huge voter registration campaign is underway, and boasts an electorate of some 40,000 individuals (the total population in Tonga in only 104,000).

Tonga's unique geography has led to wide economic disparities between the main island of Tongatapu and the poorer, more rural outlying island chains. The Ha'apai region has an estimated per capita GDP 40% lower than the national average. Huge transportation costs for exporting agricultural products and importing industrial goods and fuel exacerbate poverty levels, and with little historical political representation, there has been no movement towards better infrastructure or transportation systems.

How will this shift to a largely democratic state affect Tonga's future? Land reform, women's rights and regional economic discrepancies will have a much better chance at being addressed by an elected government not beholden to private interests. With more geographically fair representation now ensured in parliament, the Tongatapu-dominated economy will not be able to continue discriminating against the outer island chains of Vava'u and Ha'apai. The current economic policies of accruing more foreign aid and government debt will likely continue ias the new government attempts to jump-start growth. With a compounded average annual GDP growth rate of 1% over the past 5 years (compared to Samoa at 4.6%, Vanuatu at 6.8%), Tonga has a lot of unrealized potential. Most recently, the World Bank announced a $50 million grant to promote infrastructure, mitigate high oil prices, and for tsunami recovery, which amounts to 18 percent of Tonga's 2009 GDP.

As the country has little electoral history, it is difficult to predict the efficacy of Tonga's new government, but Tongans should be heartened by their newfound power. Recent political forums have covered the spectrum of local issues, and we will almost certainly see significant changes take place in the very near future.

Colonial Legacies & Contemporary Influence: Linguistics vs. Economics

The recently superior performance of the German economy relative to those of other developed countries has reignited the question of whether Germany should exert greater influence and take a more prominent role in world affairs. Despite being the fourth largest nominal economy (after the US, China and Japan) and serving as the increasingly dominant engine of European economic performance, Germany does not command a position commensurate with this economic stature in terms of geopolitical and cultural influence.

While the legacy of World War II precludes Germany from significant military spending and excludes membership in the UN Security Council, another significant factor in Germany’s limited socio-cultural and linguistic influence is its lack of an enduring postcolonial legacy.

By 1914, Germany had amassed significant overseas territories (see map at right, with black indicating German colonial possessions); however, its loss in World War I saw these colonies transferred to Allied (mostly British) control, and the return of most German settlers in these regions to continental Europe.

As a result of both the relative brevity of colonial rule and limited number of permanent German-speaking settlers in its (former) colonies, German has hardly any reach beyond Europe as a native or official (see the map above right, where orange depicts an official language, yellow a secondary language status, and orange squares a minority population of German speakers) .

Much like Italian and Dutch, German has no sphere of influence comparable to the Lusophere, Hispanosphere, Francophone and Anglosphere (including the Commonwealth) that resulted from Portuguese, Spanish, French and British imperialism. The result is that German cultural influence abroad is much less significant than the influence of much smaller and economically weaker European countries such as Portugal and Spain.

While Germany is the most populous country in Europe, German is not as widely spoken as the European languages whose global “spheres of influence” resulted from colonial and imperial expansion. Among languages with European origin, the most widely spoken are Spanish (429m speakers, 26 countries), English (428m speakers, 57 countries), French (300m, 31 countries), and Portuguese (240m, 13 countries). Germany, by comparison, has roughly 101m speakers in 8 countries, all of which are European.

The major spheres of linguistic influence have political relevance too, as multiple international political associations and inter-governmental organizations have emerged out of former colonial unions. The Anglosphere is broadly reflected by the Commonwealth of Nations, an organization of 54 member states that is headquartered in London and headed by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. The Francophone realm is similarly manifest in the Francophonie, which has 56 primary members and headquarters in Paris. The Lusosphere and Hispanosphere, as well, are visible in the contemporary Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (based in Lisbon) and the Organization of Ibero-American States (based in Madrid and headed by King Juan Carlos of Spain), respectively.

At the end of October, the 13th Francophonie Summit was held in Montreux, Switzerland. At the summit, Canada pledged millions to French-speaking Africa; French President Nicolas Sarkozy rallied support for combating cholera in Haiti; and the summit participants adopted a joint declaration promising to confront human rights violations among and within its member states. News of the summit reached audiences from Belgium to Benin. With the next summit scheduled for 2012 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (home to perhaps the most flagrant human rights abuses in the Francophonie, if not the world, as well as a major recipient of foreign aid), the summit underscored the enduring influence of France and contemporary relevance of French in shaping global events and driving global discourse.

Even with sustained economic growth, Germany does not have the cultural and linguistic influence of other European powers with a more enduring postcolonial legacy. As a result, its political role as a center of international cooperation does not match that of many less economically powerful European neighbors.

Below is an outline of the political, social intergovernmental organizations that are based, loosely, on former colonial empires, and largely representative as well of linguistic ties and cultural influence.

The Commonwealth of Nations

(Official members in blue; former members in orange; membership broadly reflects the linguistic Anglosphere)

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie

(See legend for membership status; blue and dark blue countries represent the linguistic Francophone)

Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa

(See legend; members denoted in red represent the linguistic Lusosphere)

Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos

(Member countries, in green, represent the Hispanosphere, with the exception of Portugal and Brazil)

The DRC: Rwandan troops in eastern Congo

An estimated 5.4 million people have died since 1998 in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite the technical end of war in 2003, rape, torture, fighting and killing continue in the eastern regions of the country today. Recent reports of Rwandan troops in Eastern Congo suggest impending political or military changes that will like result in increased civilian casualties.

Bordering nine countries and possessing a disastrous history of imperial rule, the DR Congo has long suffered at the hands of not just its own government but also at those of neighboring countries and distant powers as well. The Congolese state was first established in the late 1800s by King Leopold II of Belgium, who killed an estimated four million Congolese while plundering the country for ivory and rubber. After a rushed independence and the assassination of Congo’s Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Mobutu came to power via a Western- backed coup. Mobutu reigned for 30 years, draining the Congo of any hope for wealth, development, or stability. In 1996, Laurent Kabila, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, invaded, initiating Congo the first Congo War, which ended with Mobutu’s overthrow in 1997. Kabila then expelled troops from Rwanda and Uganda; as a result, Rwanda and Uganda reinvaded in 1998, starting the second war. Many of the underlying causes of these conflicts (overflow from the Rwandan genocide, a collapsing weak state, competition over natural resources, and local ideological grievances) continue to provoke the violence in the east today.

Rwandan involvement in the Congo has been particularly strong and particularly devastating. Rwandan government and paramilitary troops have been in and out of the DRC for the last two decades, profiting from Congo’s minerals and killing and raping large numbers of its people. A recentUN mapping report even suggests that Rwanda’s documented killing of Hutu refugees between 1993 and 2003 could potentially be considered genocide. The Rwandan government also supported the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a notorious Tutsi-dominated rebel group that operated in eastern DR Congo, terrorizing civilians, exploiting minerals, and destabilizing the region. But a 2008 UN report documenting Rwanda’s support of the CNDP led to severe international criticism. President Paul Kagame then traded his support of the CNDP for a compromise with Kinshasa. The result was a joint military operation against the Hutu-extremist Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which contains some of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. After those efforts to attack the FDLR and integrate the CNDP into the Congolese national army—both of which had severe civilian casualties—came to an end, Rwandan troops officially left the country in February of 2009.

Recent information from DR Congo, however, suggests a renewed Rwandan presence as well as an impending spike in violence. Many sources have reported Rwandan troops wearing Congolese uniforms in the east. After meeting with Rwandan president Paul Kagame recently in Kinshasa, Joseph Kabila announced a mining ban in eastern Congo. The CNDP’s relationships with the two governments have also become increasingly hostile. Despite a technical integration into the Congolese national army, CNDP command structures and loyalties remain largely unaffected by the change in uniform. Rumors of ex-CNDP troops being forced to move out of the Kivu regions have also been circulating. This potential redeployment has enraged CNDP members because they fear a move away from their family, ethnic kin, and historic stronghold would cost them the considerable amount of legitimacy and authority they’ve established in the Kivus.

So why are Rwandan troops in the Congo? They could be there to help Kabila clean up the mining business by fighting rebel groups and criminal gangs that curr

ently roam eastern DR Congo. The FDLR, Rwanda’s traditional enemy rebel force, still operates in Congo, possibly prompting Rwandan troops to re-enter the area. The huge mineral deposits in the area are another potential lure. Yet many observers, including CNDP officers themselves, believe that the troops are actually there to keep the CNDP officers in check after the upcoming redeployment. Rumors that Rwanda is worried about a CNDP alliance with other anti-Kigali forces are also circulating, which would make Kagame’s desire to move the CNDP away from the Rwandan border and its historic stronghold all the more understandable.

CNDP officials have reportedly said that they will “set the region on fire” if deployed out of the Kivus region. The presence of Rwandan troops will likely intensify the conflict, generating numerous civilian casualties. Whether as a result of abusive local leaders, meddling foreigners, or conflict between the two, Congolese civilians have suffered time and time again throughout the conflict in the DRC. Unfortunately, the newest developments in the Congo show that that trend is far from over.

Images courtesy of Initiative For Central Africa's "L'économie minière au Kivu et ses implication régionales" and usaid.gov.

Brazil's Presidential Election and the Significance of Marina Silva

http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/b/brazil/brazil-presidential-election-2006.html
http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/b/brazil/brazil-presidential-election-2010.html

Note: The maps above provide some representation of voting by region in Brazil. However, Brazilian presidential elections are based on the overall votes for the entire country. There is no American-like Electoral College system.

As cited in The Economist on Oct 7, 2010, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) candidate Dilma Rousseff looked deflated and was disappointed after not reaching the absolute majority she needed to win the presidency of Brazil in the first round on Oct. 3, 2010. The Economist reported that Rousseff claimed 46.9 per cent of the vote, which was “three to four percentage points” less than predicted by many polls. http://www.economist.com/node/17204613?story_id+17204613

In the next round of the election Dilma Rousseff faces a run-off against José Serra, of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and runner up in the first-round election. Rousseff and Serra spar primarily for the votes won by various third-party candidates, particularly those cast for Marina Silva of the Green Party. The Economist recognized Silva as the most successful candidate from a third party since the end of the military dictatorship in the 1980s, taking 19.3 per cent of the vote. http://www.economist.com/node/17204613?story_id+17204613

The reasons for Marina Silva’s success are numerous, but perhaps most significant are her environmental stance and her religiosity. She is an evangelical Christian, which likely gained her votes from Brazil’s growing population of Protestants. Additionally, Silva ’s background is closer to that of President Lula than those of either Serra or Rousseff; she grew up impoverished, the daughter of rubber-tappers from the Amazonian state of Acre. She gained a university degree, moreover, by working to support herself, far surpassing Lula in educational attainment. As a politician, she was first elected to the Senate in 1994, representing her home state of Acre. In 2003 she was nominated President Lula’s Minster of the Environment.

Marina Silva’s involvement in the 2010 Brazilian presidential election is also notable because both she and Dilma Rousseff fomerly served as ministers in President Lula’s cabinet. Rousseff was the Brazilian equivalent of Chief of Staff from 2005 until March of 2010, when she quit to run for the presidency. Marina Silva was Minister of the Environment until 2008, when she resigned, frustrated that the Lula government was pursuing pro-business policies at the expense of the environment. The last straw was President Lula’s decision to appoint Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Minister of Planning, to develop an Amazonian development strategy, The Plan for a Sustainable Amazon, a position that she wanted for herself.

Marina Silva’s decisions to leave the Lula government, and later to renounce membership in the PT, and run for president on the Green Party ticket demonstrate her lack of support for the Lula government’s environmental policy. It might have been expected that Silva would have supported Dilma Rousseff in the second round of the presidential election. But, as Rousseff has run on a platform of continuing Lula policies, Silva declined to back either her or her rival in the second round. Such a lack of public support is especially injurious to the Rousseff campaign, overtly demonstrating Silva’s discontent with both Rousseff and the Partido dos Trabalhadores.

The states won by Rousseff in the first election round are almost exactly the same as the ones Lula carried in 2006 (see maps below). Lula’s crucial voting bloc in the 2006 victory consisted of the impoverished northeastern and northern, or Amazonian, states (although the states of Amazonia are sparsely populated). Key to his successful courtship of this population was the expansion of the conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família. Impoverished families of the northeast and north were, per capita, the largest beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program. Lula also enjoys “favorite son” pull in the northeast; his natal state was Pernambuco (he moved to São Paulo as an adolescent.) But Dilma Rousseff also carried those same states even though she is not of northeastern heritage, but rather hails originally from the southeastern state of Minas Gerais is of Bulgarian ancestry. Evidently northeastern voters identified her with the economic successes of the Lula administration and the Bolsa Família.

It also is likely, however, that Dilma Rousseff lost many voters in the northeast and north of the country who were persons who had voted for Lula and benefitted from the Bolsa Família. Some likely reasons for this are Marina Silva’s religious affiliation and also her background (being of mixed race and growing up the daughter of rubber-tappers in the Amazon).

Another key constituency of Marina Silva’s was the educated middle class. This is the group of voters in Brazil most likely to have been drawn to her pro-environment stance. This is most evidenced by the fact that the Distrito Federal was the one electoral district Marina Silva won outright, and may be Brazil’s electoral district most dominated by the educated middle class. Another state in which Marina Silva was quite successful was Rio de Janeiro, a state that likely has voters who voted for her for pro-environment stance, those who identify with Marina Silva’s rise from poverty, and those who identify with her Protestantism.

Chinese "Oil": The Exportation of Rare-Earth Minerals

This image is a map of the world's deposits of rare earth minerals.

China’s September 2010 spat with Japan regarding waters which both countries claim as part of their exclusive sovereign territory amounts to another feud in a series of Chinese border conflicts. What differentiates this dispute from the others was China’s willingness to halt the export of rare-earth minerals to Japan in order to gain advantage in the altercation. This behavior reinforces a recent trend of China restricting the sales of rare earths. In July 2010, China announced a 72 percent reduction of rare earth export quotas for the rest of the year. The export quotas for this year totaled 30,258 tons, which is significantly less than the 65,609 tons of rare earth minerals exported in 2005.

This is a distribution of the rare earth mineral deposits across China.

Consequently, countries highly dependent on rare earths, such as Germany and Japan, began to panic. An official of the Federation of Germany Industry anonymously noted that with regards to rare earths, “China runs a virtual monopoly. There is a real need to develop new sources". German Chancellor Angela Merkel responded by stating that it was “urgently necessary” to step up European investment in regions such as Eastern Europe or Central Asia in order to break the reliance on China. Furthermore, Germany agreed to convene a special conference in early November 2010 with members of the WTO and European Commission to discuss the issue. Yoshikatsu Nakayama, Japanese vice-minister of the economy, trade, and industry warned that Japan’s cache of rare earth minerals could vanish by March or April unless China reverses its export ban. Japan is deeply concerned about the situation, due to the heavy reliance on rare earths for a wide array of its export products, ranging from hybrid cars to LCD screens.

China is able to wield such influence because it is the dominant supplier of rare earths to the world market. According to the Government Accountability Office, China produced roughly 120,000 tons of rare earths in 2009, or 97 percent, of the world’s supply. Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 statement that, “there is oil in the Middle East; but there is rare earth in China” has been realized by the Chinese. For certain minerals, such as dysprosium and terbium, China produces over 99% of the world’s supply. These minerals are utilized in nuclear reactors, fluorescent lamps, and hybrid cars, among other applications.


To understand China’s strategy in this regard, it is necessary to look at the distribution of rare earth deposits around the world. Estimates suggest that China possesses anywhere from 36 to 50 percent of the global reserves. While this figure is high, significant deposits of rare earth minerals are obviously located outside of China. The largest rare earth concentration is actually in Greenland at the Kvanefjeld Mines, which accounts for 36 percent of the world’s supply. The next largest deposit is at the Bayan Obo mines in Inner Mongolia, in northern China. While roughly 32 percent of the world’s deposits are located here, Bayan Obo produces approximately 45 percent of the global supply. After these two major locations, concentrations drop off significantly. Some rare earth deposits lie scattered across Australia, and 7 percent of the world’s supply lies in the Mountain Pass Mines in California near the Nevada border.


Deposits outside of China, however, are rarely worked. As the 2010 U.S. Geological Survey of Mineral Commodity Summaries indicates, while 120,000 tons of rare earth production came from China, only 2,700 tons came from India, and only 650 tons from Brazil. No production was recorded from the United States or Australia in 2009. Surprisingly, Greenland with its Kvanefjeld Mines was absent from the list as well. The government of Denmark, which controlled all oil, gas and mineral resources in Greenland until early 2010, has opposed all resource extraction that involves radioactive materials which are usually found in association with rare earth minerals. As a general rule, environmental hazards have formed a barrier for rare earth mining. Ore materials are usually embedded with radioactive elements, such as thorium, radium, or uranium. In order to isolate the rare earth minerals from the radioactive material, the ore must be intensively processed in acid baths generating large quantities of toxic waste. In the case of California’s Mountain Pass mines, extraction was suspended in 1998 after thousands of gallons of radioactive waste spilled into the neighboring land. For much of the world, stringent environmental regulations make rare earth mining economically impractical. In China, with its lax environmental standards, such conditions do not exist, creating an excellent setting from which to extract rare earth minerals with little concern for regulations.

An image of the Mountain Pass Mine in California.

While China has been the predominant supplier of rare earth minerals for some time, it is currently seeking to reduce exports for several reasons. While some claim this decision is a "21st century economic weapon" and a case of monopolistic bullying, China argues that it is simply trying to conserve these non-renewable resources. China may also be trying to increase the market value of its exports. One government official explicitly stated that China “wants a higher price on our rare earth minerals [so that] foreign buyers more or less share our costs, including the high cost of reducing environmental pollution".

The resulting rare earth shortages have begun to catch attention of governments across the world. As a result, new production sites are being explored in areas such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and Greenland. The Government Accountability Office, however, estimates that it may take up to fifteen years before the U.S. can rebuild its supply chain. Significant costs to entering the market may preclude private investors from making a real impact unless government subsidies are forthcoming. But with the increasing need for rare earth minerals in both green technologies (wind turbines, electric and hybrid cars) and defense industries (anti-missile systems, jet engines, or missile guidance systems), this issue has serious national security implications as well. As a result, a number of countries may soon begin to invest heavily in rare earth extraction.